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ABSTRACT
When, in societies today, civic commitment decreases, there is
a call for the need to strengthen citizenship education, identiﬁed
uniquely with its public dimension and, on the other hand, the
requirement for character education has been advocated, which is
a cultivator of the most strictly private dimension. Setting out from
the recognition of the new social conditions, mediated by the
phenomenon of globalisation and of the place that people have
in these new contexts, we ask ourselves about the new proﬁle
which the construction of citizenship must adopt. We endeavor to
show that the moral dimension is the core of reconsidering the
link between the private and the public, so it would currently be
meaningless to propose an education of citizenship exclusively
focused on its public dimension.
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Problematisation of citizenship in current societies
In the face of the recalcitrant data on the decrease of citizen participation in recent
decades, alternative proposals to the traditional ones founded on the search for the
participative increase of citizenship have emerged. It is assumed that in the irruption of
a new era it is necessary to ﬁnd formulas capable of satisfying the requirements of
political equality in the new contexts of a marginalisation of citizenship in democratic
life (Parvin, 2018). In a world with highly porous borders, the new concept of citizen-
ship demands the inclusion of the ‘other stranger’ (the foreigner, the marginalized
minorities, the vagabonds . . .) as ideal, an inclusion which often is in contradiction with
the policy model of the nation-state in a neoliberal capitalism environment (Bosniak,
2006; Isin, 2002), a model which contributes to the deconstruction of the democracy
itself (Balibar, 2015). The global changes in the new era oblige to remake the sense of
democracy and the idea of participation in the polis, especially because we notice
a manifest decline of civic commitment in contemporary societies, reﬂected in a drop
in the levels of citizen participation in social life.
The present social, political and cultural framework alerts about the capital relevance
of citizenship education—the more plainly its drive has been called for, the more
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fruitless it has been—identifying it exclusively with its public or political dimension. For
example, the current growing euroscepticism, after more than 60 years since the Treaty
of Rome, must have something to do with the scant emotional cohesion, with the
null invocation of the profoundest layers of citizenship, with the lack of cultural, moral,
sentimental and spiritual intangibles, capable of edifying the anchorages required for
a genuine unity.
It is necessary, then, to stop and observe the current scenarios, from a respectful
interpretation of both history and tendencies, which are noted in the complex and vast
current world, in order to contextually elucidate the grammar that a new citizenship
education requires.
Globalisation and its eﬀects
The dynamism which characterises the present world, inexistent in previous periods, is
not only swifter, or ‘haywire’ (Giddens, 1999), but it also aﬀects social practices more
deeply. The progressive process of diﬀerentiation of the forms of human activity has led
to the decoupling of social relations in their local contexts and their new ordination in
undeﬁned spaciotemporal areas. As a result of the impact of technologies and its social
practices, the physical and symbolic 'mobility' (Urry, 2007) reveals that the individual
experiences are more unattached of its traditional conditions of proximity, immediacy,
continuity, coherence and emotional implication, generating a greater complexity in the
construction of individual and community identities (Giddens, 1991). As Sassen (2007)
already announced, the small-scale activism which implicitly or explicitly has a global
agenda is crucial to properly address the complexity of the mutual interdependence
among peoples, and to strengthen the close ties between the local (statewide) and the
worldwide, which are becoming increasingly necessary given the progressive deterritor-
ialization of the citizenship.
However, due to globalisation, a patent separation has taken place between the
economy and the social and political entities, without the latter being able to exercise
an eﬀective control over the former (Esmaeili, Rad, Samadi, Asgari, & Fard, 2017). Even
in developed countries, economic development is incurring a weakening of the middle
and low classes, increasing inequality, as richness remains conﬁned to a very reduced
sector of the population. This only serves to increase the feeling of rejection towards the
elites, particularly political, which have shown themselves to be incapable of facing the
serious problems of citizenship. Under the amplifying eﬀect of social networks and
mass media, extremisms and populisms grow in this breeding ground, oﬀering sim-
plistic solutions susceptible of anchoring in those whom have by now lost all hope in
what they know (Preite, 2017). Extreme movements have thus emerged as a promising
route to penalise the political systems, ﬁnding a place among the population, especially
those who are most vulnerable and despondent (Pilkington & Pollock, 2015). It is clear
that in many people a loss of trust in democracy has taken place and a feeling of
dissatisfaction with the institutions has spread (Campos & Martín, 2015; Williamson,
2014).
Concern or consternation is also due to many aspects of unforeseeable scope,
divested of the current scientiﬁc and technological revolution, which call into question
numerous values and realities. These until recently seemed solid and now appear to
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collapse in front of our astonished gaze: the search for the ‘elixir’ of eternity, genetic
manipulations, the loss of intimacy, the threat of uncontrollable robots . . . The frigh-
tening shadow of a credible threat to humanism hangs over the world. This is perhaps
represented exemplarily by the phenomenon of dataism (Harari, 2016). This menaces
us with a conception of the universe as an immense ﬂow of data, the value of any
phenomenon or entity being determined by its contribution to the inﬁnite processing of
information. Our experiences acquire a value only if they are shared in the voracious
and insatiable networks.
On the other hand, a logic of war and violence has also emerged in our current
world, seriously altering the logic of the paciﬁc constructions of societies. A clear
exponent is the rupture between the West and the Arab Islamic world, which is leaving
on both sides a tragic trail of death, destruction and desolation. The erosion of human
civilisation’s ethical dignity does not cease.
Thus, as a ﬁrst idea of globalisation refers predominantly to an image of a world
controlled by economic, ﬁnancial or business networks, the prevailing present conﬂicts
suggest the confrontation of cultural settings—(not linked to frontiers and states—)and
religious groups, not necessarily connected to the economy or to politics. The world’s
current situation is also explained by the conﬂict between diﬀerent cultural and
religious backgrounds and beliefs.
Beyond the set of performance indicators we can muster to account for the various
gaps produced in our globalized world, we attend to the downturn of citizenship
because it has been generated by a breakdown of ties between the system and the
subjects while still social actors, possibly because of the exhaustion of a model focused
on the social integration itself. Traditionally, societies have been set up in the integra-
tion of individuals to the collective sense of a rule, closing oﬀ alternative possibilities of
searching said sense, being that odds generators of questions (Castoriadis, 1998). Apart
from the goodness of progress, the harmful eﬀects of globalization seem to lead today to
the rupture of said closure of the sense across the world, since it is increasingly evident
that the sense of a rule for the system does not frequently correspond to the one that
individuals have. Citizenship education invokes an ethical question.
Ethical dimension of citizenship
Everything seems to indicate that we are witnessing the exhaustion of a political model
centred exclusively on society, its functions and its integration. We are moving towards
a new society where people are compelled to their own conﬁguration; as we are cast into
a world which no longer counts on the referential solidity of past times. Social changes
foreground cultural rights. These are universal, though claimed from individuals
(Goodale, 2016). Threatened by the pernicious slope of globalisation and by an obsession
with identity, the subject manifests itself in opposition to the drama of the seductive
invasion of an ‘economy of lightness’ (Lipovetsky, 2015) and of the alienation of com-
munitarian proposals that enshrine certain social or cultural categories (Puchol, 2012).
We can debate the success or failure of the model of society which triumphed in the
West. Consequently, we can feel optimistic about the achievements of progress or pessi-
mistic that the ruin generated and accumulated. The new human situation requires
correctly channeling the communication and awareness-raising capable of proﬁling this
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new social sphere. This is not to be restricted to the goal of economic growth and enables us
to escape a doctrinal insistence in the perspective of the welfare state (Camps, 2010) or in
the economist liberalism which tends to restrict our time unequivocally (‘Time is money’).
Beyond functionalist formulas and the reiterated denunciation of critical thought,
there is an urgent need for the generation of conditions which make the creation of free
and responsible actors possible (Valentinov, Hielscher, & Pies, 2016). This will be via
rational thought and respect for human rights, capable of projecting itself in social
institutions interested in freedom and eﬃciency, in justice and care.
We need to learn from each other and there are diﬀerent and legitimate processes of
modernisation in the world. But there are certain principles, such as the prevalence of
human rights and the belief in reason, typical of Western modernity (Nucci, 2016;
Shayegan, 2008), which reveal that not all of the processes are equivalent. These principles
form the conditioning factors that make the realisation of human dignity possible. The
‘recognition’ of the other (Taylor, 1994) demands a reasoning: it must be recognised as
such, both accepting the universal principles, to which some are closer than others, without
identifying them with any historic modality. One thus aspires to the pleasure of an
encounter with the other from cultural singularity, in a framework capable of reconciling
the universal moral view of belonging with the warmth of the local community (Appiah,
2006). The relevance of this encounter has been profoundly and radically postulated by the
so-called ‘pedagogy of alterity’, especially from proposals such as that of Levinas (Ortega,
2004; Peperzak, Critchley, & Bernasconi, 1996). These days, citizenship is aﬀected if it is
not extended to areas in which most personal and collective experience is developed.
It is necessary to go thoroughly into the ethical dimension of citizens, attempting to
attain their deepest strata where ethos is crystalised. The concern for the state to have to
take care of the character of its citizens, that ‘education of the soul’ to which Appiah
(2005) has referred, is an absolutely current question. Education must stress, along with
caring for ‘political literacy’ and participation in public, social and cultural life, the
development of critical thought and of the attitudes which foster the awareness and
responsibility of recognising ourselves as citizens.
The broadening of identities, their opening to what is universal, combating the
danger of navel-gazing and solipsistic narcissism, depends on caring for the processes
of individualisation (Leung, 2013). If politics refer to the collectivity, to what is
common to all individuals, and ethics is focused on the person, the notion of citizenship
brings us to the image of a dominion interrelated with both individual and collective
action. We therefore see ourselves bound to try and fruitfully combine, in multiple
ways, commonly accepted principles with cultural, personal and social inheritances and
projects (Bernal, 2017). Here we have the core of a genuine citizenship education,
concerned likewise with probing into organisational and pedagogical strategies which
foster ethical thought and transform citizens (Lilley, Barker, & Harris, 2017) from
a sentimental adhesion. Social cohesion depends on this.
Conceptual review. The controversy between character education and
citizenship education
Traditionally, the diﬀerentiation between character education and citizenship education
has been recurrent. Though we can admit distinctions and nuances between both, it is
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no less true that they are interlinked. Precisely, we try to show that the moral dimension
is the area in which they intertwine, making a reconsideration of the link between the
private and the public necessary.
Reviewing what has happened, for example, in the wake of the UK’s 2016 Brexit vote,
we note, along with speciﬁc nationalist elements (an emotional component reinforcing
diﬀerentiations, a perception of having been harmed, a revindication of a rigorous
control of immigration to safeguard social cohesion or security, and ‘Britishness’ or an
exaggerated feeling of identity), a certain dilemma linked to the education area between
two models: citizenship education and character education associated, respectively, with
proposals which are more progressive or more conservative (Conroy, 2017), according
to a privileging democratic education or one of the individual (Davies & Chong, 2016).
So, the legislative promotion from 2010 of character education at the expense of the
protagonism of citizenship education, has been able to apparently link up with the
‘spirit’ of Brexit, although this association has been criticised with precisely contrary
arguments (Fuentes & Albertos, 2017; Johnson & Morris, 2012).
Indeed, although the interest in citizenship education has developed since the sixties
under diﬀerent denominations (political education, global education, education for
development, etc.), it was at the beginning of our century, in 2002, that it was integrated
for the ﬁrst time in a national British curriculum as a subject: Citizenship Studies.
Promoted by the Labour Party, this curricular initiative is engaged with the ideas
expressed in the well-known Crick Report, a document elaborated by a group of
experts, coordinated by Professor Bernard Crick. The aforementioned initiative is the
foundation of the legislative text which propitiated the explicit incorporation of citizen-
ship education in the curriculum. Its intention was to drive, from the very State, civic
and moral education. Social and moral responsibility, political literacy and participation
in community life are the main axes of citizenship education. This presents a relevant
moral dimension of communitarian inspiration. In this way, although not patently,
character education became a subject of interest for the British educational policy.
Nevertheless, the National Curriculum reform, published in 2013 and in eﬀect from
2014, carried out with the arrival in power of the coalition between conservatives and
liberals in 2010, suppressed the compulsory subject Citizenship Studies and emphasised
an interest in character education, underlining the importance of personal realisation,
of the development of virtues and ways of being (Kristjánsson, 2016), beyond academic
achievements.
Clinging to axiological neutrality, to a value-free position, can lead to giving rele-
vance uniquely to the political dimension of citizenship education, ignoring its moral
dimension. But without a solid ethical foundation it is diﬃcult to perceive the crucial
importance of understanding and participating in political matters. Thus, a person
acquires a singular value of justiﬁcation at a moment when the notions of nature appear
darkened through scientiﬁc and technological development and the state-nation (Naval,
Fuentes, & Quintanilla, 2017).
Interiority and citizenship ethics
In this complex framework of the ethical construction of citizenship, education seeks
a foundation in pointing out the learnings of freedom which help to contribute to the
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education of stable citizens in the ‘liquid’ society, invoking the celebrated adjectivisation
of Bauman (2000). The well-known Delors report underlined the need for a convivial
education between very diﬀerent people, given the huge current social mobility. Civic
construction does not invalidate or minimise the construction of the personal being of
each citizen, but rather claims this category (Mauri, 2016) as a principle and foundation
upon which collective interests will be able to be constructed more solidly, even in times
of uncertainty.
The meaning of life itself brings the person to an interior regard, to this multi-
dimensional construction of the being which, from the Athenian frontispiece until our
days, has not ceased to confront humanity: self-knowledge, as that invitation to rescue
each one’s most genuine identity features.
It is a question of a life whose meaning can be acquired, lent, imposed, discovered or
created, but whose ﬁnality will not be valid if it does not emerge from the most internal
part of each person. The study of the interior dimension brings us to this, not as an
apology for the duality of interiority versus exteriority, but as a pledge for integration as
a counterpart of division. The drama of modern humankind is no other than this split,
this fragmented living that the postmodern condition appears to solve through living
outwards and a great lack of interiorisation.
The theories of learning have also lived out this duality between those who place the
object of learning outside the individual and those who understand the construction of
knowledge as being typical of the learner. In this sense, it has been highlighted that
knowledge is not only constructed in interaction but also in introspection, having been
extracted, sedimented and consolidated inside the subject of knowledge, so that it shows
outside, following the Kantian tradition revealing belief in the potential of development
of the very being. This empathises with the conviction of Hannah Arendt (1964) when
she stated that the greatest evil that can be committed is to deny oneself from being
a person, referring to the banality of evil personiﬁed in Adolf Eichmann, lieutenant
colonel of the SS and one of the most terrible criminals in history, who asserted in his
famous 1961 trial to have never done anything on his own initiative.
The pedagogical itinerary towards interiority means a ﬁght against the tide with
regard to a system in which concern for competitiveness, individualism, superiority,
an accelerated rhythm, the preeminence of multitasking, possessiveness and power
reign. These are conditioners which, instead of liberating, trap people, measuring
them by external parameters: to compete in relation with the other, to measure
oneself by unfair treatment and by exceeding alterity, making prevail the possessive-
ness of people and external relations, and exercising power towards the other. This
identity construction with extrinsic references to the very being, builds individuals
identiﬁed with external constructs and de-identiﬁed with what is most internal, with
the ego itself. This generates internal fragmentation, creates a considerable uprooting
and a valuing and validation that is always according to parameters in permanent
ﬂuctuation. These are liquid, ephemeral and mutable, easy to convert into what is
gregarious and massiﬁed, pending volitions and externalised indicators. In this line,
currently, the distinction that Sen (1999) makes between what one can do and be
seems interesting to us. The set of capacities is a bundle of opportunities to choose
and act, most of which do not depend only on the person, but on multiple factors of
the very environment.
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Could this capacity of being oneself be defended morally as a balancing value in the
achievement of being citizens? To unlearn acquired behaviours in order to learn others
related to the interior life is often required. These are not imposed but acquired by
conviction due to personal belief, a guarantee of holding on to a greater commitment.
A conciliating game of opposites is what we require to carry out the cultivating of
interiority.
Looking at the person from an ethic that pledges respect and human dignity and
understanding the deployment of what is most genuine in that dignity, it is worth
considering the construction of the being from an ethic that deploys the originality of
each essence. This has a capacity of each essence, with both its own construction and
autonomous decision concerning vital, personal projects which enables living in society
in a harmonious and supportive manner. ‘The degree of ethical competence is in
correspondence with the breadth of awareness and of personality’ (Neumann, 2004,
p. 579). What is at stake is the delimitation of the ethic-moral bases which serve as
principles of the behaviour of citizens in pursuit of co-living and social development.
Virtuous citizens are the foundation of virtuous societies. Yet the virtuous life for a fair
citizenship which, at the same time, is fulﬁlled or happy requires a moral education
mindful of both internal and subjective aspects and more objective aspects of happiness
(eudaimonia), in a constant course through moral philosophy (Kristjánsson, 2013).
To give form to existence itself in a plural society, recognising that not all versions of
happiness are compatible with the requirements of justice (Ivic, 2011; Martínez, 2011),
means legitimising the originalities of each person, allowing those spaces and times
necessary to consolidate the learning of being, that learning from the personal identity
construction where individuals develop publicly, but it comes after a prior internal
construction.
An interior tradition, however, has been able to fall into the withdrawal of the ego
itself. Even so, from awareness as a science of the very self (Fierro, 2005), theories of
education have seen in self-knowledge and in self-observation a source of indispensable
knowledge. The relational complexity of self-knowledge does not only consist of
knowing and being aware of our ideas, emotions and feelings, but also ‘of the way in
which they are organised to make up a project of life that considers its own needs, but
also those of others’ (Buxarrais, 2016, p. 45). This is where the construction of the being
coalesces—but does not collide—with the civic identity of the very being.
Pedagogies of being can go deeply into interiority as a reencounter of what is most
original in each person, recuperating the permission that at times we do not give
ourselves to be ourselves. Interiority implies, in the end, along with the unequivocal
emotional dimension which it acquires, a revindication of reason, of the capacity to
elaborate judgment. Faced with the critics of the value of rationality, we cannot blame
reason for the problems of the world. This is an instrument which helps us to construct
inferences from certain premises. The correct choice of the latter is what is relevant.
The holocaust was not the consequence of logic but of racism and hate. The critical
argumentation against reason, when it suggests alternatives (intuition, will, emotion,
etc.), recurs to elements which, by themselves, can lead to both desirable and hapless
situations. An anti-rationalist position determines the substitution of one biased per-
spective by another.
JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION 7
As projects of shared humanity, as necessarily relational beings, can we be citizens
without constructing and deploying our own being? Can we develop our genuine being
without deploying our civic identity? In some way, ‘thinking of oneself and living for
others at the same time, once considered a contradiction in terms, is revealed as an
internal, substantive connection’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2003, pp. 281–282). All this
considers parameters of well-being as a complement to the parameters of welfare.
Ethical concern for political questions. An updated reconstruction of the
area of citizenship
The question of interiority in relation with the community and its inﬂuence in
a radically relational personal being again invites the reconsideration of the links
between a public moral and a civic or public ethic.
Public moral necessarily has to be designed as a democratic ethic; that is to say,
a civic, participatory and plural ethic. That is, a civic ethic which seeks a foundation for
a general social morality disseminated by the mass media, civil associations and educa-
tional institutions. This public moral has also been called ‘ethics of minima’ (Cortina,
1992), ethics which bless moral values such as the equal dignity of people, civil freedom,
solidarity, plurality and the dialogued management of interpersonal conﬂicts in the
public arena.
This is precisely the core of a subject such as ‘Education for citizenship’, whose
primordial aim is to boost a democratic civic ethic; that is, a public ethic updated to the
new times and in the face of new socio-moral challenges such as the urgent environ-
mental problem or the question of freedom in the area of sexuality. However, these
challenges do not exclusively belong to the sphere of what is public, but rather to the
privacy of decisions such as that of recycling or not, or the personal way of coping with
the diversity of sexual opinions (therefore, intimate) which struggles for visibility and
public recognition. This is therefore an issue of a traditionally private space, such as that
of the family.
In view of these questions, what most interests us now is to observe the way in which
public morals and private morals are necessarily intermixed or mutually aﬀected, to the
same extent to which it is extremely decisive to overcome this dialectic—that necessary
complementation—between individuals and society, and even between happiness and
justice. In recent years, the ethic that has been cultivated and which has been thought
about is the public, the civic, the social and shared space or sphere: the ethic of social
justice, which has to be driven by education as a space for fostering discourse and civic
comprehension in a Habermasian key (Martin, 2015). The foundation of this approach
was formalist, procedural, and eminently called for the structure of a fair morality,
consensual, and sharable from plurality. The other, the private, was the sphere of
axiological polytheism that Weber talked of, that of the unwavering variety of contents
about happiness, a sphere that each one had to solve very personally according to their
expertise and understanding, or according to what they belonged to or preferred.
The public-private dichotomy alludes in some way to the distinction between
procedural morals and speciﬁc contents morals, between justice and happiness, between
society and the individual, between rationality and caring emotion, between minimum
and maximum morals. These are eﬃcient and operative dichotomies which still abound
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and continue being valid to understand the complexity of our normative horizon. But it
happens that our moral dimension, that of human beings who daily decide about what
is good and what is fair, is irremediably unique (exception made of cases of moral
schizophrenia or psychopathy). We are functional units, not a set of separated mental
districts that at best support each other, despite the doubts or moral perplexities which
often temporarily abduct our capacity of judgment and action.
All of this induces us to consider if it is not there, in that intersection between the
private and the public, in the unﬁnished bridge between oneself and the others, between
the structure and the content—between justice and a good or happy life—where one
has to look at the failure of a civic moral that does not touch or which perhaps does not
even brush up against our sensitive ﬁbre, our most meaningful and intimate wish.
An unﬁnished public moral and a confused private moral. What is to be done? Do
we ceaselessly enlarge that unfathomable gap between the self and the other? Or do we
proceed with an ethical and educational reconstruction of the public (the communal,
the social and the transnational) that encourages from intimate conviction? We will try
to contribute some traits for this reconstruction.
One of the foundations is to rediscover new ways for freedom in those which remain
to be explored: as well as freedom as autonomy, so decisive in education, one should
delve into freedom as non-domination, linked to civic participation and into freedom as
human development.
Freedom as moral autonomy
Indeed, moral autonomy has been a valid social and educational ideal since Kant. To
think for oneself (not only about oneself), to have one’s own judgment as an antidote to
a run-of-the mill life, to have a critical capacity that weighs the arguments and
consequences of a course of action, to use intelligence to overcome biases and dogmas
of all persuasions . . . these are undoubtedly some of the great aims of education in
modern and post-conventional societies, which cannot renounce the educational value
of dialogue and moral reasoning (Nucci, 2016). This is something that post-modernity
has not been able to cast aside, as it is an ethical ideal united with emancipation and
vital for the plurality so dear to what is post-modern (Vattimo, 1990).
We understand that civic education has to assume the value of moral autonomy as
a necessary complement for freedom from liberalism, that freedom which essentially
means the independence of people or the non-interference of the others in them:
a freedom that undoubtedly prevails in free-market societies. The search for relational
autonomy, intertwined, valid also in the area of the private, helps to overcome liberal
individualism which, in its origin, meant a salviﬁc movement in the face of the tyranny
and the absolutism of the State. Yet taken as an absolute model this becomes a new
form of tyranny in the shadow of a vapourous and cruel economism.
Freedom as non-domination
From the debate between liberals and communitarians that took place at the end of the
last century, emerged as a synthesis a new way of understanding freedom, interpreted as
non-domination. To be free is not only to be independent from the rest, from the State
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or the society. To be free is, as we have known since Kant, to be morally and
intellectually autonomous. But it also is, following the republican tradition put together
by authors such as Bellah or Pettit, to live a life in which we do not submit ourselves to
arbitrary powers (or micropowers), either in the public or in the private or daily areas,
nor to psychologically self-imposed powers. Freedom is to live a life without servitude,
without us having to lower our eyes in the face of an authority that is arbitrary and not
recognised as such (Pettit, 1997), an authority which can be external or internal. Often
the most diﬃcult prison to liberate oneself from is inside. Freedom is not exactly, and as
classical liberalism wishes, an absence of interference, but rather of domination.
Interference and interdependence are inevitable, due to the fact of living in society.
The key is in this interference not being arbitrary, not being abusive, not undermining
the thin line which protects from unworthy treatment. Hence the importance of
training the person not to succumb to these illegitimate interferences. For example,
for pure liberals where there is law and rights there is not freedom. On the other hand,
for republicanism freedom requires the good and necessary interference (of beneﬁcial
competition) of law and rights. It is there, in the area of rights, where it is moreover
necessary to participate in democracy as citizens for our free condition to be so in
plenitude, without unconscious alienations. Free citizenship is educated developing in it
civic virtues and ways of participation which redound in collectively constituted norms.
The revindications of feminism can be found at home when speaking about freedom
understood in this manner. That is, a freedom that breaks with the classic barrier that
separates the ego from the others, the private from the public, seeking points of
encounter and ineludible links between personal dignity and social commitment.
Classic liberalism, which enshrines the reign of private freedom compatible with
domination by sex in the sacred sphere of intimacy, that liberalism which has been
erected in a partial and substitutive universalism in favour of the Western male
(Benhabib, 2011), has to be surmounted. To educate for citizenship today is, then, to
do so in non-domination, in civic participation for the common good and the establish-
ing of relations of respect. It is a matter of fostering cooperative relations to eradicate
bullying and cyberbullying, to triumph over—gender or ethnic—based forms of dom-
ination; to actively contribute to an environmental and sustainable consumption (an
increase), avoiding future generations being submitted to the tyranny of the few who
administer scarce resources for a healthy life. It is also necessary to develop civic virtues,
to construct civitas for a fair law which defends the interests of citizens (Camps, 2003).
Likewise, we must turn to an ethic not only of rights and obligations, but also of habits
and customs, of dispositions acquired from willingness, from actions thought and felt
from critical deliberation and treating the other well; an ethic which considers authen-
ticity and coherence.
Tocqueville, in the orbit of republicanism, spoke of the importance of these habits of
the heart so necessary for the good functioning of democracy, indispensable in both the
public and the private. It is the citizens who have to raise the moral bar of their societies
from their capacity to judge and act in the diﬀerent areas of their life, beginning with
life in educational centres, as the protagonists of the moral world (Gozálvez & Jover,
2016; Snir & Eylon, 2017). Democracy is not only a mechanism of choice of the
governing elites, but rather a way of civic life built in an educational manner and
which aﬀects the relations of human beings as beings who are, as Dewey stated,
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irremediably social and active. Thus, to be free is something that only happens in
democratic environments, after assuming that democracy is a way of facing existence
based on a series of values and virtues: from active respect towards the other and
towards oneself, to the freedoms or the pledge for solidarity and social justice (Guichot,
2015). To this we could add other values and moral aspirations such as a participatory
spirit committed to a public, relational autonomy, a critical examining of oneself, or
non-domination in the face of diﬀerent forms of servitude.
Freedom as development
Civic education also requires exploring freedom understood as a development of
human capacities and as personal ﬂourishing or realisation, as Sen and Nussbaum
propose (Wilson-Strydom & Walker, 2015). To develop a life worth living cannot occur
without taking into account the real functioning of human freedom in concrete social
contexts. Nussbaum (2000) turns to a case that magniﬁcently exempliﬁes this idea and
which, en passant, helps us to understand that ethical intersection between the social
and the personal. She refers to Vasanti, an Indian woman who, after abandoning
a violent and wasteful husband, received external help from a civic association
(SEWA, or Self-Employed Women’s Association), a group which helped her to develop
her capacities for a free and fulﬁlled life. She learnt to read and write. At the same time,
she was provided with economic help to not have to depend on a loan from her
brothers and sisters. After the enabling action of the SEWA, Vasanti managed to be
free of debts and became an activist against domestic violence. To educate to really live
a daily life is to stimulate and empower the capacities of people. It is not necessary to
live in India to understand and put oneself in the shoes of Vasanti: one only needs to
live in society and to experience some privation in the deployment of their capacities; it
is enough to observe a serious impediment in carrying out the project of one’s own or
another person’s life; an impediment which is not always in the public sphere and can
very well revert us to more or less conscious, self-imposed oppressions.
It is especially interesting to insist that educating for democratic citizenship not only
has to involve instructing about the knowledge of facts or the logical capacity of the
learners: it is also necessary to develop in them the narrative imagination: ‘This means
the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person diﬀerent from
oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s story’ (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 95–96).
Again, the construction of democracy must be through the help of intelligence and
comprehensive emotion, pooling in the life of people a reﬂection about themselves and
a concern for the other, the personal or private and the common or public. Social
justice is not only a necessary condition of a happy life: it is an elemental form of
happiness itself.
Keys of educational reconﬁguration of citizenship
A new project of citizenship is through bringing a universalist ethic of human rights
closer to cultural and particular contexts of life: the attempts to attain an ethic situated
in human rights from the idea of recognising the other (Benhabib, 2005; Gozálvez &
Jover, 2016). The search for social justice has to be rooted, on the other hand, in hearts.
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From the notion of cordial justice (Cortina, 2010), it is worth navigating towards the
idea of universalised and universalisable care, tracing limits and potentialities on the
most erotic—aﬀectionate—side of morality.
The ultimate aim is the educational reconﬁguration of a civic feeling united with the
reconstruction of a personal moral identity. The citizenship awaiting us aﬀects our
personal being and our common humanity, thus in an emocognitive key, as our
emotion is thought out and our intelligence is sentient (Zubiri, 2004). The micro,
meso and macrosphere of ethics are not distant worlds, and perhaps emerge from
a primordial moral core: recognising the other in me and myself in the other, celebrat-
ing in passing the very personal features of each one. Yet this celebration is not
legitimate if this fundamental practical experience has not been brought about and
has not taken place before. First is to know oneself, to possess oneself with good
judgment and sensitivity.
This is precisely why citizenship is a condition open to the exteriority of the political,
the judicial, the social, the economic, and undoubtedly also to the ecological and to the
mass media. In these levels of human reality, personal beings must forge themselves as
autonomous, free beings capable of thinking of the innumerable burdens of servitude.
This is a citizenship for which the public is not limited to the state, something that from
action is exempliﬁed with educational initiatives such as the Service-learning projects
(Tinkler, McGann, & Tinkler, 2017), contributing in this way to the revitalisation of the
civil society from a felt conviction and from an experience thought, deliberated and
critically open to the other.
Conclusion
Faced with the risk of a deconstruction that is both unlimited and sterile concerning the
challenge of the ethic involvement of citizenship, we require an educational reconstruc-
tion of the public capable of genuinely taking root in our intimacy. The diverse paths
which we can adopt, in this sense, necessarily accentuate the relevance of the personal
subject as a social actor via the reconﬁguration of individual and collective experiences,
able to recompose the polarisations which have been typiﬁed because of the deployment
of the diﬀerent processes of contemporary modernisation. The ethical (re)construction
of citizenship does not admit ambiguities concerning the recognition of the glory which
corresponds to the freedom of the subjects who, nevertheless, have to deploy it in the
framework of shared social and political projects, continually asking themselves about
its meaning and pertinence.
Hence, we consider that citizenship is an interior condition projected towards the
exteriority of the political, social, economic, judicial, ecological and mediatic spheres of
the current world. The division and segregation between the private and the public has
been precisely an obstacle for full development. We accumulate reasons for hope, in
spite of the multitude of arguments to feed pessimism. To reduce citizenship at present
to its political dimension is not only biased, but also probably reactionary. Political
rights and social and cultural rights complement each other. The ethical construction of
citizenship must integrate the voices of the arc of social actors, harbouring the real
capacity of facilitating ways of reciprocity and recognition of the principles which have
resisted the whirlwind of the corrosion of time and criticism, reason and rights.
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The moral dimension is the essential domain for the reconsideration of the link
between the private and the public. At the same time, it is the area towards which we
must look if we aspire to surpass the sterile polemic between character education and
citizenship education. It is not possible to educate citizens from deliberately biased or
dualist proposals.
To educate for a ﬂourishing and fulﬁlled civic life is a legitimate educational yearning
in democratic societies, a proposition that forces reconstructing the abysm between the
public and the intimate space, and which likewise links the subjective and objective
aspects (personal and social) of self-realisation or eudaimonia (Han, 2015). Such is the
current challenge that we educators have proposed: to oﬀer, starting out from school,
the opportunity to convert the proposals of social justice into something lived by
oneself, and to cultivate the more cordial and meaningful side—more joyful—of living
according to civic virtues.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of the Government
of Spain, State Plan 2013–1016 Excellence—R & D projects, under Grant number EDU-2013-
42936-P.
Notes on contributors
Antonio Bernal Guerrero is Professor of Theory of Education at the University of Seville, Spain.
His research interests include the theory of education, educational personalization, identity
formation and enterprise education.
Vicent Gozálvez Pérez is Professor of Philosophy of Education at the University of Valencia,
Spain. His research and teaching interests are focused on the philosophy of education, inter-
cultural pedagogy, citizenship education and media education.
Marta Burguet Arfelis is Professor at the Faculty of Education of the University of Barcelona,
Spain. His research and teaching interests are focused on education in values, education for
peace and conﬂict, educational relations and interiority education.
References
Appiah, K. A. (2005). The ethics of identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Appiah, K. A. (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers. New York, NY: W.W.
Norton.
Arendt, H. (1964). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil. New York, NY: The
Viking Press.
Balibar, É. (2015). Citizenship. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2003). La individualización. El individuo institucionalizado y sus
consecuencias sociales y políticas [Individualisation. The institutionalised individual and their
social and political consequences]. Barcelona: Paidós.
JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION 13
Benhabib, S. (2005). Los derechos de los otros: Extranjeros, residentes y ciudadanos [The rights of
the others: Foreigners, residents and citizens]. Barcelona: Gedisa.
Benhabib, S. (2011). Dignity in adversity: Human rights in troubled times. Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press.
Bernal, A. (2017). La educación como capacidad fértil [Education as fertile capacity]. In
J. A. Ibáñez-Martín & J. L. Fuentes (Eds.), Educación y capacidades: Hacia un nuevo enfoque
del desarrollo humano [Education and capacities: Towards a new approach of human devel-
opment] (pp. 71–85). Madrid: Dykinson.
Bosniak, L. (2006). The Citizen and the alien: Dilemmas of contemporary membership. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Buxarrais, M. R. (2016). El cuidado ético como camino hacia el ser [Ethical care as a path
towards beings]. In M. R. Buxarrais & M. Burguet (Eds.), Aprender a ser. Por una pedagogía de
la interioridad [Learning to be. For a pedagogy of interiority] (pp. 43–53). Barcelona: Graó.
Campos, M. P., & Martín, A. (2015). Youth voice(s) in EU countries and social movements in
Southern Europe. Transfer, 19(3), 345–363.
Camps, V. (2003). Republicanismo y virtudes cívicas [Republicanism and civic virtues]. In
J. Conill & D. Crocker (Eds.), Republicanismo y educación cívica. ¿Más allá del liberalismo?
[Republicanism and civic education. Beyond liberalism?] (pp. 243–256). Granada: Comares.
Camps, V. (2010). El declive de la ciudadanía [The decline of citizenship]. Barcelona: PPC.
Castoriadis, C. (1998). Los dominios del hombre: Las encrucijadas del laberinto [The domains of
men: The crossroads of the maze]. Barcelona: Gedisa.
Conroy, J. C. (2017). El brexit y la alteridad: Una modesta reﬂexión asistemática [Brexit and
otherness: A modest unsystematic reﬂection]. In J. A. Ibáñez-Martín & J. L. Fuentes (Eds.),
Educación y capacidades: Hacia un nuevo enfoque del desarrollo humano [Education and
capacities: towards a new approach to human development] (pp. 41–52). Madrid:
Dykinson.
Cortina, A. (1992). Ética mínima [Minimal ethics]. Madrid: Tecnos.
Cortina, A. (2010). Justicia cordial [Cordial justice]. Madrid: Trotta.
Davies, I., & Chong, E. K. M. (2016). Current challenges for citizenship education in England.
Asian Education and Development Studies, 5(1), 20–36.
Esmaeili, L., Rad, H. A., Samadi, A. R., Asgari, M., & Fard, A. R. Z. (2017). Analyzing the
phenomenon of globalization with a focus on the ﬁeld of culture and economics, with
emphasis on developing countries. Quid-Investigación Ciencia y Tecnología, 1, 1983–1988.
Fierro, A. (2005). Uno mismo a examen [Oneself examined]. Escritos de Psicología, 7, 15–23.
Fuentes, J. L., & Albertos, J. E. (2017). Educación del carácter y educación para la ciudadanía:
Alcance y limitaciones [Education of character and education for citizenship: Scope and
limitations]. In J. A. Ibáñez-Martín & J. L. Fuentes (Eds.), Educación y capacidades: Hacia
un nuevo enfoque del desarrollo humano [Education and capacities: towards a new approach to
human development] (pp. 157–172). Madrid: Dykinson.
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Giddens, A. (1999). Runaway world. London, UK: Proﬁle Books Ltd.
Goodale, M. (2016). Human values and moral exclusion. Ethics & Global Politics, 9, 1–13.
Gozálvez, V., & Jover, G. (2016). Articulación de la justicia y el cuidado en la educación moral:
Del universalismo sustitutivo a una ética situada de los derechos humanos [Articulation of
justice and care in moral education: From substitutive universalism to situated ethics of
human rights]. Educación XXI, 19(1), 311–330.
Guichot, V. (2015). El enfoque de las capacidades de Martha Nussbaum y sus consecuencias
educativas: Hacia una pedagogía socrática y pluralista [The approach of the capacities of
Martha Nussbaum and her educational consequences: Towards a Socratic and pluralist
pedagogy]. Teoría de la Educación. Revista Interuniversitaria [Theory of Education.
Interuniversity Journal], 27, 45–70.
Han, H. (2015). Purpose as a moral virtue for ﬂourishing. Journal of Moral Education, 44(3),
291–309.
Harari, Y. N. (2016). Homo Deus. Barcelona: Debate.
14 A. BERNAL GUERRERO ET AL.
Isin, E. F. (2002). Being Political. Genealogies of citizenship. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
Ivic, S. (2011). Care through deliberation: Towards the idea of contextual morality. Filosoﬁcky
Casopis, 59(4), 517–531.
Johnson, L., & Morris, P. (2012). Critical citizenship education in England and France:
A comparative analysis. Comparative Education, 48(3), 283–301.
Kristjánsson, K. (2013). Virtues and vices in positive psychology: A philosophical critique.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Kristjánsson, K. (2016). Recent work on ﬂourishing as the aim of education: A critical review.
British Journal of Educational Studies, 65(1), 87–107.
Leung, G. (2013). Cosmopolitan ethics from below. Ethical Perspectives, 20(1), 43–60.
Lilley, K., Barker, M., & Harris, N. (2017). The global citizen conceptualized: Accommodating
ambiguity. Journal of Studies in International Education, 21(2), 6–21.
Lipovetsky, G. (2015). De la légèreté [On lightness]. Paris: Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle.
Martin, C. (2015). Nudging the public sphere: A Habermasian perspective on public deliberation
as an aim of moral education. Journal of Moral Education, 44(4), 440–456.
Martínez, M. (2011). Educació i ciutadania en societats democràtiques: Cap a una ciutadania
collaborativa [Education and citizenship in democratic societies: Towards a collaborative
citizenship]. Temps d’Educació [Time for Education], 40, 11–23.
Mauri, M. (2016). El ser existencial: Dimensión ﬁlosóﬁca [The existential being: Philosophical
dimension]. In M. R. Buxarrais & M. Burguet (Eds.), Aprender a ser. Por una pedagogía de la
interioridad [Learn to be. For a pedagogy of interiority] (pp. 17–26). Barcelona: Graó.
Naval, C., Fuentes, J. L., & Quintanilla, I. (2017). La educación para la ciudadanía global. Buenas
teorías que orientan buenas prácticas [Education for global citizenship. Good theories which
orientate good practices]. In M. A. Hernández (Coord.), Educación para la vida ciudadana en
una sociedad plural [Education for citizen life in a plural society] (pp. 243–271). Murcia: Edit.
um, Ediciones de la Universidad de Murcia.
Neumann, E. (2004). Hermenéutica del alma [Hermeneutics of the soul]. In A. Ortiz-Osés &
P. Lanceros (Dirs.), Diccionario de Hermenéutica [Dictionary of hermeneutics] (pp. 573–590).
Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto.
Nucci, L. (2016). Recovering the role of reasoning in moral education to address inequity and
social justice. Journal of Moral Education, 45(3), 291–307.
Nussbaum, M. (2000). Women and human development. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Nussbaum, M. (2010). Not for proﬁt: Why democracy needs the humanities. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Ortega, P. (2004). Moral education as pedagogy of alterity. Journal of Moral Education, 33(3),
271–289.
Parvin, P. (2018). Democracy without participation: A new politics for a disengaged era. Res
Publica. A Journal of Moral, Legal and Political Philosophy, 24(1), 31–52.
Peperzak, A. T., Critchley, S., & Bernasconi, R. (Eds.). (1996). Emmanuel Levinas. Basic philo-
sophical writings. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism. A theory of freedom and government. Oxford, UK: Clarendon
Press.
Pilkington, H., & Pollock, G. (2015). “Politics are bollocks”: Youth, politics and activism in
contemporary Europe. The Sociological Review, 63(S2), 1–35.
Preite, G. (2017). Paradoxes of democracy and depoliticisation in the social peripheries of
modernity. Partecipazione e conﬂito, 10(3), [Participation and conﬂict], 874–895.
Puchol, M. (2012). Una educación para una ética de la ciudadanía como vía contra el fanatismo
[Education for an ethic of citizenship as a way against fanatisism]. Encuentros
Multidisciplinares [Multidisciplinary encounters], 14(42), 66–75.
Sassen, S. (2007). A sociology of globalization. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.
Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Shayegan, D. (2008). La luz viene de Occidente [Light comes from the west]. Barcelona: Tusquets.
JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION 15
Snir, I., & Eylon, Y. (2017). Civic republicanism and education. Democracy and social justice in
school. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 36(5), 585–600.
Taylor, C. (1994). Multiculturalism. Expanded paperback edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Tinkler, B., McGann, G., & Tinkler, A. (2017). Learning from each other: Using a
service-learning citizenship course to promote intercultural understanding. Intercultural
Education, 28(5), 447–455.
Urry, J. (2007). Mobilities. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Valentinov, V., Hielscher, S., & Pies, I. (2016). Emergence: A systems theory’s challenge to ethics.
Sistemic Practice and Action Research, 29(6), 597–610.
Vattimo, G. (1990). La sociedad transparente [The transparent society]. Barcelona: Paidós.
Williamson, H. (2014). Radicalisation to retreat. Responses of the young to austerity in Europe.
International Journal of Adolescence and Youth, 19(S1), 5–18.
Wilson-Strydom, M., & Walker, M. (2015). A capabilities-friendly conceptualisation of ﬂourish-
ing in and through education. Journal of Moral Education, 44(3), 310–324.
Zubiri, X. (2004). Inteligencia sentiente [Sentient intelligence]. Madrid: Tecnos.
16 A. BERNAL GUERRERO ET AL.
